Escalating competition for dominance over Africa’s digital infrastructure

On 9 October, the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) confirmed plans to expand direct equity investment in strategically important African projects, following its 16 September approval of up to USD 155 million for West Indian Ocean Cable Company (WIOCC) Group. The pan-African digital infrastructure operator has a network footprint spanning more than 30 countries, over 115,000 km of terrestrial fibre and more than 40 core and edge data centres. Its infrastructure also connects to major submarine-cable systems, including Equiano and 2Africa. The proposed investment would give DFC a financial stake in an established platform serving telecommunications operators, cloud providers and enterprise customers across Africa. The transaction remains subject to completion, while the proposed ownership percentage and governance rights have not been disclosed. Nevertheless, it represents a deliberate expansion of US investment into the infrastructure supporting Africa’s digital economy.

The investment forms part of a wider US effort to strengthen the commercial position of American technology providers. In September, the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) approved USD 99.6 million in financing for Africell, principally to expand telecommunications infrastructure in Angola using American and European equipment. The US Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) also backed a proposed fibre expansion in northern Ghana and committed USD 1.87 million towards feasibility studies for two Nigerian AI-ready data centres, initially targeting 60–70 megawatts (MW) of capacity. American technology company Cybastion separately proposed investments worth approximately USD 300 million in Senegal and signed an October partnership with Vertiv to pursue data-centre projects across six African countries. These initiatives remain at different stages of development, but together show the growing use of US public finance to support American participation in Africa’s telecommunications, computing, and digital services markets.

The strategy closely aligns with US efforts to expand international adoption of American AI and cloud technologies. DFC has explicitly identified infrastructure capable of supporting major American technology companies as an investment priority. Equity participation in established operators provides access to existing networks and commercial relationships, while export financing supports the procurement of American equipment. As African governments digitise public services and businesses expand their use of cloud computing, infrastructure providers will influence the selection of technical systems, commercial partners and service standards. American companies could therefore secure longer-term relationships extending across connectivity, data hosting and AI services. The effectiveness of this approach will depend on the competitiveness of US technology, infrastructure operators’ procurement decisions and African customers’ willingness to adopt these services.

China retains a substantial advantage in established telecommunications infrastructure. Huawei accounts for an estimated 52 percent of Africa’s fifth-generation (5G) infrastructure market, while Chinese suppliers have longstanding relationships with operators and government institutions across the continent. Their involvement extends into network maintenance, technical training and equipment upgrades, creating commercial relationships that can persist across successive generations of technology. American companies have stronger positions in advanced AI computing, major cloud platforms and parts of the international connectivity market. The expanding US financing programme is bringing these competing technology ecosystems into closer contact, particularly as African operators upgrade networks and governments invest in domestic computing capacity. Chinese suppliers remain well positioned to compete for new infrastructure contracts, supported by established commercial relationships and experience delivering integrated telecommunications systems.

The competitive environment is also attracting more investment from Africa and the Gulf. On 1 September, Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) and Saudi Arabia’s Vision Invest signed a combined USD 300 million investment agreement with WIOCC to support its fibre, submarine-cable and data-centre expansion. DFC’s proposed participation would bring American public capital into the same infrastructure platform. Separately, MTN Group announced an August partnership with United Arab Emirates (UAE)-linked investors to develop data-centre infrastructure, initially focusing on South Africa and Nigeria. These arrangements demonstrate the growing importance of African operators and Gulf capital in shaping investment opportunities. They also give African companies additional financing relationships and more scope to negotiate with foreign partners. The involvement of several investor groups means that infrastructure ownership and technology procurement will increasingly involve overlapping commercial interests, even as the US and China pursue competing strategic objectives.

African governments are using this competition to advance their own technological ambitions. Egypt provides a particularly clear example. In late August, Huawei reportedly proposed an AI infrastructure package involving more than 2,000 Ascend chips, prompting American companies to explore competing arrangements. In September, Egypt announced a partnership involving Vodafone Business, Elsewedy Electric and Cassava Technologies to develop an Nvidia-supported AI data-centre platform. The project envisages an initial 20 MW of capacity, potentially expanding to 200 MW, with investment projected to reach USD 1 billion over its development. Egypt’s engagement with competing suppliers shows how governments can leverage strategic importance and market potential to attract alternative technologies and negotiate investment terms. However, access to advanced American semiconductors remains subject to US export controls, while differences between Chinese and American computing systems can constrain the extent of technological diversification.

Senegal is pursuing a comparable objective through its sovereign digital infrastructure programme. President Bassirou Diomaye Faye’s administration has prioritised domestic cloud capacity, government data control and the development of national technological expertise. Its September discussions with Cybastion included proposed investments in data centres, cybersecurity, and public-sector digital systems, along with commitments to explore technology transfer and Senegalese business participation. Côte d’Ivoire is also developing a USD 66 million government-owned data centre with US financing and technology support, targeting operations in 2027. These initiatives reflect the increasing political importance African governments attach to digital infrastructure and their ability to manage essential public services. However, ownership of domestic facilities leaves governments dependent on foreign computing hardware, specialist software and technical support. Their influence over these systems will depend on procurement arrangements, domestic expertise and the institutional capacity to manage technology partnerships.

This dependence also extends into government information systems and international technology standards. The competing proposals in Egypt reportedly included potential applications involving identification and surveillance technologies, illustrating how decisions concerning foreign computing infrastructure can affect domestic state capabilities. Meanwhile, American and Chinese technology providers operate within different regulatory and commercial ecosystems. Governments adopting these systems can become dependent on associated software, maintenance arrangements, and technical standards, increasing the cost of switching suppliers. The African Union (AU) has been advancing continental AI governance arrangements, while national governments continue to develop their own policies concerning sensitive information and digital public infrastructure. Their ability to establish effective oversight and retain control over technology deployment will shape the political consequences of expanding foreign involvement.

Regional fragmentation presents a further constraint. African digital markets remain governed by different licensing systems, data-protection rules and public procurement arrangements, even as major infrastructure operators expand across national borders. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Digital Trade Protocol and AU digital initiatives provide frameworks for greater regulatory cooperation. However, implementation depends on governments whose domestic priorities include preserving regulatory authority, spectrum revenues and control over national information systems. This creates practical advantages for multinational technology companies that can operate across multiple jurisdictions. African infrastructure operators face similar barriers when expanding regional services. Greater regulatory coordination could strengthen African companies’ competitiveness and governments’ collective negotiating position, but progress will depend on national political commitments and institutions’ willingness to align their policies.

US investment is likely to consolidate American commercial influence in Africa’s cloud, AI and connectivity markets, particularly through established operators and major digital hubs. China is expected to retain its strong position in telecommunications equipment and existing networks, while Gulf investors will play a growing role in financing competing infrastructure platforms. The emerging division of technological influence will increasingly favour American companies in advanced computing and cloud services, while Chinese suppliers retain extensive relationships across telecommunications networks. African governments will continue to use competition between providers to secure investment and access to technology, with larger markets such as Egypt and Nigeria enjoying greater negotiating leverage. Continental regulatory coordination is unlikely to keep pace with foreign investment, leaving national governments to negotiate many of these arrangements individually. As infrastructure partnerships develop, control over computing technologies, procurement standards, and digital services will increasingly determine Africa’s technological autonomy.