Executive Summary
The Horn of Africa is becoming more closely integrated into a wider Red Sea political and security system in which ports, defence partnerships and sovereignty disputes increasingly affect one another. Competition between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has accelerated this process, while Horn governments continue to shape it according to their own priorities. Somalia is using new Saudi, Qatari and Turkish security partnerships to reinforce federal authority; Somaliland is converting Berbera’s infrastructure and external recognition into diplomatic leverage; Ethiopia is balancing maritime ambitions with worsening relations with Eritrea; and Eritrea is using its coastline to recover regional weight. These relationships remain fluid, but the growing connection between African disputes and cross-Red Sea partnerships is narrowing the space for treating them as separate regional questions.
On 14 February 2026, diplomats attending the African Union (AU) Summit were openly discussing the widening Saudi Arabia–United Arab Emirates (UAE) rivalry as a Horn of Africa issue. Three days later, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Ethiopia and publicly backed Somalia’s territorial integrity while maintaining Türkiye’s close relationship with the Ethiopian government. Those developments captured the structure emerging across the region: outside powers are deepening their security and commercial positions, while Horn governments continue to work across competing relationships and use them to advance sovereignty, security and economic objectives.
Somalia is the clearest example of this process. After terminating its federal agreements with the UAE in January, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s government rapidly expanded security ties with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. Somalia signed a military cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia on 9 February, following a defence arrangement with Qatar the previous month, while Türkiye confirmed the deployment of F-16 fighter aircraft and maintained its extensive military training presence. The UAE had previously financed salaries and logistics for around 3,400 Somali security personnel, so replacing Emirati support involved an immediate security requirement alongside the political dispute.
The deeper contest concerns who has authority to conduct Somalia’s external relations. Somaliland, Puntland and Jubbaland rejected the federal government’s attempt to terminate their relations with the UAE, while UAE-linked infrastructure in Berbera and Bosaso continued to operate. Somalia’s new partnerships, therefore, strengthen the federal government’s claim that defence and foreign policy belong to the national state, while sub-state authorities continue to demonstrate that they can sustain their own external economic and security relations. Cross-Red Sea competition is consequently reinforcing Somalia’s unresolved internal dispute over the distribution of political authority.
Somaliland has gained additional leverage from the combination of strategic geography and infrastructure. DP World has invested approximately USD 442 million in the Berbera port, creating a commercially viable logistics asset near Bab el-Mandeb and providing Ethiopia with a potential alternative to its heavy reliance on Djibouti. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December 2025 added a diplomatic dimension to an asset that already had practical value to the UAE and Ethiopia. The AU continues to recognise Somaliland as part of Somalia, yet Berbera allows Somaliland’s authorities to engage with external states through port access, logistics, and investment, even as its international legal status remains contested.
Ethiopia’s maritime agenda links this sovereignty dispute directly to relations with Eritrea. On 7 February, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos accused Eritrea of military aggression and support for armed groups while again indicating that Ethiopia was willing to negotiate access through Eritrea’s Assab port. Eritrea rejected the accusations. Ethiopia already possesses commercial access through Djibouti, making the current debate more closely connected to diversification, strategic dependence and the degree of control Ethiopia seeks over additional maritime routes. Berbera and Assab therefore carry different sovereignty implications for Somalia and Eritrea while serving the same Ethiopian objective of reducing dependence on a single maritime corridor.
Ethiopia is attempting to preserve room to manoeuvre across these relationships. Its strategic and financial relationship with the UAE remains deep, yet it continues engaging Türkiye and Saudi Arabia and has avoided binding itself to one external grouping. Erdoğan’s 17 February visit demonstrated this flexibility. Türkiye could oppose Somaliland’s recognition, maintain its security relationship with Somalia and continue close engagement with Ethiopia at the same time. This cross-cutting diplomacy makes descriptions of a settled UAE–Ethiopia axis or Saudi–Türkiye–Egypt alignment too rigid for the current environment.
Eritrea is pursuing a different form of leverage. President Isaias Afwerki has argued that Red Sea coastal states should carry greater responsibility for maritime security, giving Eritrea a role that exceeds its economic weight. A Saudi delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Waleed bin Abdulkarim al-Khereiji met Isaias on 12 February to discuss Red Sea security and expanded political and economic cooperation. This state-centred approach aligns with Saudi Arabia’s growing emphasis on recognised governments and territorial integrity, particularly in Somalia and Sudan. It also gives Eritrea additional diplomatic value at a time when Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions have increased the strategic importance of Assab.
The UAE’s regional position combines state relationships, commercial port concessions and engagement with autonomous authorities. Berbera in Somaliland and Bosaso in Puntland are the clearest commercial examples. In Sudan, the UAE has repeatedly been accused of supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), allegations it denies. Saudi Arabia’s recent response has leaned more heavily towards central governments and state institutions, including Somalia’s federal government, Eritrea and actors aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). These approaches create different incentives for Horn actors depending on whether their priority is strengthening central authority, preserving local autonomy or securing external financing.
Sudan shows how these relationships can move from diplomacy and infrastructure into direct military consequences. Egyptian deployment of Turkish-made Bayraktar Akıncı drones near the Sudanese border in early February coincided with a harder Egyptian posture towards the conflict, while separate reporting indicated that approximately 4,300 fighters linked to the RSF were being trained at a facility in Ethiopia. Eight sources attributed financing and logistical support for the facility to the UAE, which denied involvement. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Qatar remain closer to SAF-aligned state institutions, while Ethiopia’s close UAE relationship creates additional sensitivity around allegations of support to the RSF. Sudan’s war is therefore increasingly connected to the same external partnerships shaping Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Ports sit at the centre of this system because they combine commercial access, revenue, military utility and political authority. Berbera strengthens Somaliland’s external position; Bosaso gives Puntland an economic relationship with the UAE independent of Somalia’s federal government; Assab gives Eritrea leverage over Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions; Djibouti remains Ethiopia’s main gateway while hosting several foreign military presences; and Port Sudan gives SAF-aligned authorities access to the Red Sea during the civil war. The political value of these ports lies in who controls access, who can negotiate concessions and which authority external partners choose to recognise in practice.
Regional institutions have not developed at the same pace as these bilateral networks. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) covers much of the Horn but does not include the Middle Eastern states increasingly shaping the same security environment. The Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden includes Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, and Eritrea, but excludes landlocked Ethiopia, as well as the UAE and Türkiye. The AU can defend principles such as Somalia’s territorial integrity, but it has limited influence over bilateral military agreements, foreign port concessions and security relationships involving sub-state authorities.
The emerging Red Sea order is likely to place greater pressure on peace and security in the Horn as external partnerships become more closely tied to unresolved disputes over sovereignty, ports and territorial access. Somalia’s federal contest with Somaliland, Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions and Ethiopia–Eritrea tensions are increasingly shaped by outside security relationships that can strengthen deterrence but can also harden local positions. The key risk is that flexible external partnerships become embedded in these disputes, reducing room for regional mediation and making local escalation more difficult to contain.